Prefixed-threshold Real-Time Selection for Free-Space
  Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution by Wang, Wenyuan et al.
Prefixed-threshold Real-Time Selection for Free-Space
Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution
Wenyuan Wang,1 Feihu Xu,2 and Hoi-Kwong Lo1
1Centre for Quantum Information and Quantum Control (CQIQC),
Dept. of Electrical & Computer Engineering and Dept. of Physics,
University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, M5S 3G4, Canada
2Shanghai Branch, National Laboratory for Physical Sciences at Microscale,
University of Science and Technology of China, Shanghai, 201315, China
(Dated: October 23, 2019)
Measurement-Device-Independent (MDI) QKD eliminates detector side channels in QKD and
allows an untrusted relay between two users. A desirable yet highly challenging application is to
implement MDI-QKD through free-space channels. One of the major factors that affect the secure
key rate in free-space MDI-QKD is atmospheric turbulence. In this work we show two important
results: First, the independent fluctuations of transmittances in the two channels can significantly
reduce MDI-QKD performance due to turbulence-induced channel asymmetry. Second, we consider
the Prefixed Real-Time Selection (P-RTS) method we formerly introduced to BB84 and extend it to
MDI-QKD. Users can monitor classical transmittances in their channels and improve performance
by post-selecting signals in real-time based on pre-calculated thresholds. We show that we can
establish a 2-dimensional threshold between Alice and Bob to post-select signals with both high
signal-to-noise ratio and low channel asymmetry in real time, and greatly extend the maximum
range of MDI-QKD in the presence of turbulence, which can be an important step towards future
free-space MDI-QKD experiments.
I. BACKGROUND
Quantum Key Distribution can theoretically provide
unconditional security between two communicating users
Alice and Bob. To address imperfections in practical
laser sources, decoy-state protocol [1–3] uses multiple lev-
els of laser intensities to estimate secure single-photon
components and thus avoiding photon-number-splitting
attacks on multi-photons.
However, practical devices - especially detector sys-
tems - are still susceptible to attacks. The Measurement-
Device-Independent (MDI-QKD) QKD protocol [4] has
been proposed to eliminate all detector side channels and
hence preventing attacks on detectors. Here instead of
Alice sending signals to Bob, they both send signals to a
third-party Charles, who performs Bell-measurements on
incoming signals and acts as an untrusted relay. Since its
proposal, MDI-QKD has attracted much worldwide at-
tention, and has seen many demonstrations in fibre sys-
tems [5–7], over as long as 404km of distance between
users [8]. MDI-QKD is also an ideal candidate in a quan-
tum network since it allows untrusted relays, and there
have been demonstrations of MDI-QKD network in a
metropolitan setting [9]. Recently, MDI-QKD has also
been extended to scenarios of asymmetric channels with
different lengths [10] and demonstrated experimentally
[11], which greatly extend its practicality by allowing the
users to be placed at arbitrary locations.
A highly desirable application of MDI-QKD would be
its implementation over free-space channels, which could
allow mobile platforms such as ships, planes, satellites to
communicate without detector susceptibilities It would
also allow these users over moving platforms to join a dy-
namic quantum network with untrusted relays based on
MDI-QKD. However, up to now, an experimental demon-
stration of free-space MDI-QKD remains challenging. In
addition to the high level of loss in free-space channels,
FIG. 1. An illustration of MDI-QKD setup. Alice and Bob
each sends quantum signals to a third-party Charles who acts
as an untrusted relay. To perform real-time post-selection,
Alice and Bob can each establish a classical channel along-
side the quantum channel, to sample the channel transmit-
tance in real time, and select only the sections where both
channels have good transmittance. Note that, this classical
channel could either be a strong laser at a slightly different
wavelength, or it could be observables such as the count rate
of the quantum detectors, which could also serve as indicator
of channel transmittance.
the atmospheric turbulence - which causes fluctuations
in channel transmittances - also plays a large part in af-
fecting the secure key rate.
To address the high loss and strong turbulence in
free-space channels, there have been proposals for post-
selection methods on the signals, which can potentially
increase the signal-to-noise ratio of the communication
session. In [12, 13], it is proposed for BB84 protocol [14]
that one can sample the classical transmittance of a chan-
nel in real-time, and optimize a threshold for the recorded
transmittance during post-processing, to discard low-
transmittance signals and increase overall signal-to-noise
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2ratio, hence obtaining higher key rate. In [15] we ex-
tended the idea in Ref. [12] to decoy-state QKD, and also
proposed that a fixed threshold can be pre-determined
before the experiment begins, independent of the chan-
nel condition, and users can use the threshold to select
signals in real-time instead of waiting until the end of
the session. This approach can reduce the storage re-
quirements for Bob, and can also simplify post-processing
computation since no optimization of threshold is needed.
In this work, we present two important results: Firstly,
we show that in the presence of turbulence (scintilla-
tion of light, which causes transmittances to fluctuate in
Alice’s and Bob’s channels), the key rate of MDI-QKD
will decrease significantly due to turbulence-induced real-
time asymmetry between the channels. This is contrary
to many’s popular belief and different from the results
we observe for BB84 (where fluctuation of transmittance
does not affect the key rate - and post-selection can make
use of turbulence to increase key rate). We show that,
without post-selection, key rate for MDI-QKD will drop
significantly for turbulent channels.
Secondly, we extend our P-RTS method to MDI-QKD,
and show that by selecting a good threshold we can
achieve much higher key rate and extended maximum
tolerable channel loss. Moreover, our threshold does not
depend on the channel condition and allows a semi-blind
approach where “bad” signals can be immediately dis-
carded, which reduces storage and compute resource re-
quirements. As atmospheric turbulence is very common
in free-space channels, we believe that this work will
be an important step towards the future experimental
demonstration of MDI-QKD.
While this work is still under preparation, we no-
tice a work on a similar subject published at [16] and
made online in December 2018. While it also applies
post-selection to free-space MDI-QKD, importantly, it
only uses a rather naive model of the problem that does
not consider the turbulence-induced asymmetry (and as-
sumes the key rate does not change in the presence of
turbulence), which we show is a rather inaccurate over-
estimation of the key rate. Moreover, it suggests a simple
“square” threshold for post-selection (which needs opti-
mization and depends on channel condition), while we
show that Charles in fact has a much larger parameter
space for threshold choice, and we propose a threshold
that can closely approach optimality, and can be pre-
determined prior to the experiment without the need to
know the channel condition.
II. THEORY
In this section we define the models we use for the
turbulent channel, for the post-selection, and also the
models for a reliable estimation of the secure key rate.
We point out an important point that, contrary to BB84
where fluctuation due to turbulence does not detrimen-
tally affect key rate, in MDI-QKD even without post-
selection, the key rate will decrease due to turbulence-
induced channel asymmetry in real-time. To address this,
we then propose solutions to set a good threshold for the
post-selection. We will show in the next section with nu-
merical results the effectiveness of the post-selection with
our proposed thresholds.
A. Channel Model under Turbulence
In a free-space channel subject to atmospheric turbu-
lence, the transmittance fluctuates with time and fol-
lows a probability distribution, which is often denoted
as a probability distribution of transmission coefficient
(PDTC) [17]. There are multiple models for such a
PDTC function, a commonly used model is the log-
normal distribution [18]:
pη0,σ(η) =
1√
2piση
e−
[ln(
η
η0
)+ 1
2
σ2]2
2σ2 (1)
where the channel is described by two parameters (η0, σ)
that respectively represent the mean transmittance and
the variance of the channel. The log-normal distribution
satisfies normalization condition when η is small
∫ 1
0
pη0,σ(η)dη ≈ 1 (2)
When η is comparable to 1, there is a non-negligible por-
tion of the probability that η > 1, in this case we should
calculate the integral from 0 to 1 to obtain a constant nor-
malization factor (smaller than 1), and divide the PDTC
with this factor, i.e. forming a truncated log-normal dis-
tribution.
By post-selecting η with a threshold ηT , we can have
a higher average transmittance among post-selected sig-
nals:
〈η〉 =
∫ 1
ηT
ηpη0,σ(η)dη∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
(3)
Again, the post-selected signals follow a truncated
log-normal distribution between [ηT , 1], hence a normal-
ization factor (total probability within the post-selected
region) is included.
Now, let us consider MDI-QKD, where Alice and Bob
are each connected to Charles with a channel. Intuitively,
here we can first assume that both channels are subject
to atmospheric turbulence, and that their fluctuations
are independent and non-correlated. We can denote the
channel transmittances as ηA, ηB respectively. Then, the
joint PDTC for the two channels can be written as
pAB(ηA, ηB) = pηA0 ,σA(ηA)× pηB0 ,σB (ηB) (4)
where the two channels are described by the (ηA0 , σA),
(ηB0 , σB) channel condition parameters. The joint
3FIG. 2. (a) A joint PDTC function for Alice’s and Bob’s real-time transmittances. (b) The contours of key rate function
R(ηA, ηB) for 4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol, for fixed intensities and infinite data size (plotted in log10 scale). We can see that
the R = 0 contour follows a near-hyperbolic shape, whose asymptotic lines represent the maximum and minimum acceptable
channel mismatch x = ηA/ηB . There is also a “gap” near the origin mainly determined by the noise (e.g. dark counts). (c)
Choice of thresholds. We can choose the R=0 boundary as the threshold. Or for simplicity, we can also approximate it using
the horizontal/vertical tangents ηcriticalA , η
critical
A of the R = 0 contour (which discard signals with low signal-to-noise ratio),
combined with the asymptotic lines xmax, xmin (which discard signals with strong channel asymmetry). Importantly, all the
information in this plot comes from the structure of R(ηA, ηB) and are independent of the actual channel PDTC, i.e. they can
be pre-determined before the experiment. In this plot ηcriticalA = η
critical
B = 0.0042, xmin = 1/xmax = 0.184.
PDTC also follows the normalization condition:∫∫
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
=
∫ 1
0
pηA0 ,σA(ηA)dηA ×
∫ 1
0
pηB0 ,σB (ηB)dηB
≈ 1
(5)
The joint PDTC can be considered as a two-variable
function on a plane defined by (ηA, ηB), as shown in Fig.2
(a). Now, we observe that for a post-selection on the sig-
nals received by Charles, he can actually observe both
Alice’s and Bob’s channel transmittances (ηA, ηB), and
make a decision based on these two observables. Impor-
tantly, he does not have to independently set a threshold
for each channel respectively (and select events where
both transmittances pass the threshold), but rather, he
is able to make a joint decision based on the two ob-
servables - for instance, selecting events based on a high
level of symmetry between (ηA, ηB) is present, instead of
based on the respective signal strength of ηA, ηB alone.
Mathematically, Charles is selecting a domain Ω ⊆ R2
in the 2D space defined by (ηA, ηB).
In the selected domain, we can perform a 2D integral
to obtain the expected values of the transmittances.
〈ηA〉 =
∫∫
Ω
ηApAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB∫∫
Ω
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
〈ηB〉 =
∫∫
Ω
ηBpAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB∫∫
Ω
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
(6)
In the simple case of a ”square” threshold, i.e.
Ωsquare = {(ηA, ηB) ∈ R2 : ηAT ≤ ηA ≤ 1, ηBT ≤ ηB ≤ 1}
(7)
the post-selection follows two independent thresholds
ηAT , ηBT . This is the simplest form of threshold Charles
can implement, and the probability distribution can be
decoupled between ηA and ηB , hence one can simply use
Eq. (3) to calculate the mean transmittances. However,
note that there are more careful (and potentially better)
ways to select such a threshold, to make use of Charles’
joint knowledge of (ηA, ηB), which we will discuss in later
sections.
B. Models for Key Rate
In [15], for BB84 protocol with a single free-space chan-
nel, we have proposed two models:
RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT ) =
(∫ 1
ηT
pη0,σ(η)dη
)
×R(〈η〉)
RIntegrationBB84 =
∫ 1
0
R(η)pη0,σ(η)dη
(8)
where R(η) is the key rate function (where all other ex-
perimental parameters are fixed, e.g. dark count, detec-
tor efficiency, misalignment etc.), and ηT is the thresh-
old used to post-select signals according to the real-time
transmittance. The “simplified model” RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT )
finds the mean transmittance among the post-selected
signals, and calculates the key rate with a static model
with this new transmittance, i.e. it assumes that all the
signals are transmitted with this mean transmittance. It
is also multiplied by the proportion of selected signals
4(since the total number of signals decreases due to post-
selection). On the other hand, the “rate-wise integra-
tion model” RIntegrationBB84 (for simplicity in the following
text we will just call it integration model in short) divides
all signals into bins of [η, η + ∆η) and adds up the key
rate in all bins. In the asymptotic (infinite-data) limit,
the integration model can make use of the entire prob-
ability distribution’s information, and always produces
higher key rate than the simplified model. Effectively,
it provides an upper-bound to the maximum key rate
RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT ) can achieve by adjusting the threshold ηT :
RSimplifiedBB84 (ηT ) ≤ RIntegrationBB84 (9)
For BB84, the near-linearity of the rate function
R(η) guarantees a fixed optimal threshold ηcritical ex-
ists, where R = 0 for all η ≤ ηcritical. This optimal
threshold position is calculated with R(η) only, and is
independent of the channel condition (η0, σ). Hence, we
can find a prefixed threshold ηcritical that maximizes the
performance of BB84 with post-selection, satisfying:
RSimplifiedBB84 (ηcritical) = R
Integration
BB84 (10)
Now, for MDI-QKD, we can firstly extend the concepts
in the BB84 case, and define the simplified model and the
integration model as following:
RSimplified(Ω) = R(〈ηA〉, 〈ηB〉)
×
(∫∫
Ω
pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
)
RIntegration =
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
R(ηA, ηB)pAB(ηA, ηB)dηAdηB
(11)
However, a crucial point here is that, for MDI-QKD,
the simplified model does not accurately represent the
key rate. The reason is that MDI-QKD heavily depends
on the symmetry between channel transmittances (be-
cause it makes use of a two-photon interference in the X
basis, and its quantum bit error rate (QBER) will depend
on the interference visibility). Suppose the mean trans-
mittances in the channels ηA0 , ηB0 are equal, and Alice
and Bob choose the same intensities. Then, without post-
selection, we can obtain 〈ηA〉 = ηA0 , 〈ηB〉 = ηB0 . This
means that, when calculating the simplified model based
on R(〈ηA〉, 〈ηB〉), we are assuming a perfectly symmetric
setup (which will presumably result in low QBER in the
X basis and a high estimated key rate). However, in real-
ity, ηA, ηB are independent variables, and they are very
likely not equal in real-time for the majority of times.
This means that, any deviation from ηA = ηB will result
in an increase in the QBER in the X basis. Overall, when
one collects the observables (counts and error-counts),
he/she will find a much larger-than-expected QBER in
the X basis, preventing him/her from acquiring good es-
timation of the phase-error rate and a good key rate.
Therefore, simplified model overestimates the key rate.
In other words, we make the observation that
turbulence-induced channel asymmetry in real-time will
decrease the key rate of MDI-QKD. This is very differ-
ent from what we observed for BB84, where key rate,
gain, and error-gain are all near-linear functions, and any
increase/decrease in error-gain due to fluctuations can-
cel out when computing the mean value. On the other
hand, for a pair of channels with symmetric mean trans-
mittances, fluctuation always decreases the visibility and
increases the QBER.
Since simplified model is not an accurate model any-
more for MDI-QKD, here we propose a better represen-
tation of the key rate in turbulence. Consider the process
of obtaining key rate for MDI-QKD, for instance, for the
4-intensity MDI-QKD protocol [19]:
R = P 2s {(se−s)2Y X,L11 [1− h2(eX,U11 )]
−feQZssh2(EZss)}
(12)
This protocol uses one signal intensity s for the Z basis
to generate the key, and three decoy intensities each for
Alice and Bob {µ, ν, ω} to perform decoy-state analysis
in the X basis. Here the constants include the intensi-
ties and the probabilities of sending them, such as s, Ps,
and the error-correction efficiency fe. We can see that
the “variables” that change with ηA, ηB are the observed
gain and QBER in the Z basis QZss, E
Z
ss, and the single-
photon contributions Y X,L11 , e
X,U
11 estimated from the X
basis observables QXij , E
X
ij where i, j ∈ {µ, ν, ω}. Over-
all, the key rate can be considered as a function of the
observables:
R(ηA, ηB) = R[Q
X
ij (ηA, ηB), T
X
ij (ηA, ηB),
QZss(ηA, ηB), T
Z
ss(ηA, ηB)]
(13)
here TXij = Q
X
ijE
X
ij are the error-gains (which correspond
to the actual observed error-counts) in the X basis. Sim-
ilar goes for TZss = Q
Z
ssE
Z
ss. All the error-gains and gains
are functions of ηA, ηB too.
In an actual experiment, the users collect the corre-
sponding counts and error-counts over the entire session,
and divide them by the number of signals sent respec-
tively for each intensity combination to acquire the av-
erage gain and error-gain. The X basis gain and error-
gain are used in decoy-state analysis for privacy ampli-
fication, and the Z basis error-counts and counts follow
error-correction and key generation. We can see that,
since an experiment actually performs privacy amplifi-
cation and error-correction on the observables collected
over the entire session and calculates their average val-
ues, we can define an observable model that accurately
represents the expected key rate in experiment:
RObservable(Ω) = R[〈QXij 〉, 〈TXij 〉, 〈QZss〉, 〈TZss〉] (14)
This model represents the actual observables one would
get in an experiment, and takes into consideration the
effect turbulence-induced fluctuations can have on the
5FIG. 3. (a) Comparison of key rate models without post-selection. As can be seen, the simplified model incorrectly assumes
the same rate as a static model, while from the observable model we can see that MDI-QKD key rate decreases significantly
with turbulence. (b) Comparison of key rate obtained with different thresholds. As can be seen, both the R=0 boundary and
the straight-line approximations (xmin, xmax, η
critical
A , η
critical
B ) greatly increase key rate and maximum distance/loss in the
channel. Here for convenience we’ve plotted the key rate versus distance between Charles and Bob in standard optical fibre
(0.2dB/km), but in terms of dB we can also see over 30dB of maximum increase in channel loss between Alice and Bob.
average QBER (error-counts) in the X basis. We plot
the observable model versus static and simplified model
in Fig. 3 (a) (without applying any post-selection). We
can see that simplified model fails to characterize the
effect of turbulence and assumes the same key rate as a
static channel, while observable model shows that MDI-
QKD key rate greatly decreases with turbulence if not
addressed actively.
C. Choice of Post-selection Thresholds
In this subsection we discuss some good choices for the
threshold Ω Charles uses when post-selecting signals.
Let us first plot out the key rate versus ηA, ηB func-
tion in Fig.2 (b). Note that this function is only de-
termined by the experimental parameters (misalignment,
dark count, detector efficiency) and the intensities Alice
and Bob choose, and it doesn’t depend on the joint PDTC
of the channels.
From it we can see that the key rate follows a near-
parabolic shape, with two asymptotic lines correspond-
ing to the maximum and minimum channel asymmetry
x = ηA/ηB (which graphically correspond to the recip-
rocal of slope). This is reasonable because the QBERs
(mainly EXij , and E
Z
ss which is less sensitive but still af-
fected) depend on the channel asymmetry, and the key
rate becomes zero at two cut-off points xmax, xmin. The
existence of these two cutoff lines for asymmetry are an-
alytically proven for the infinite-decoy case in Ref.[10],
which shows that for R = 0 there are two groups of solu-
tions at xmax, xmin, regardless of the actual amplitudes
of ηA, ηB , while for the case of finite-decoys the result
is numerically shown (although yet to be proven analyt-
ically because there is no simple analytical formula for
EXij ).
In BB84, the optimal threshold we select was ηcritical
such that all η < ηcritical satisfy R(η) = 0. Similarly,
for MDI-QKD, since we know all the information in the
R(ηA, ηB) plot, here we can propose to use a threshold
Ωboundary defined by where R(ηA, ηB) ≥ 0:
Ωboundary = {(ηA, ηB) ∈ R2 : R(ηA, ηB) ≥ 0} (15)
To simplify the implementation, it’s also possible to
approximate this boundary (which takes a near-parabolic
shape) with four straight lines, representing two charac-
teristics: ηcriticalA , η
critical
B (which are mainly determined
by the dark counts), and xmax, xmin (which are mainly
affected by basis misalignment). We can then require the
signals to jointly satisfy the conditions on signal-to-noise
ratio and symmetry, i.e.
Ωjoint = {(ηA, ηB) ∈ R2 :ηAT ≤ ηA ≤ 1, ηBT ≤ ηB ≤ 1,
xmin ≤ ηA/ηB ≤ xmax}
(16)
The two thresholds are plotted in Fig. 2(c). Importantly,
the plot R(ηA, ηB) is generated without any information
of the PDTC, and all the above information including
R = 0 boundary, ηcriticalA , η
critical
B , and xmax, xmin are
all acquired from the plot of R(ηA, ηB) alone, which
only depends on the intensities and the experimental
parameters (misalignment, dark count rate, detector
efficiency etc.), but are independent of the actual joint
PDTC of the channel. This means that they can be
very conveniently pre-determined before the exper-
iment for real-time post-selection of signals (instead
of having to optimize the threshold after the experiment).
6III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
Here we present a numerical simulation for the post-
selection method we proposed. For simplicity, here we
consider a 4-intensity protocol with infinite-data size
and fixed intensities. First, we tested the key rate of
MDI-QKD in the presence of turbulence without post-
selection. As can be seen, the simplified model “overes-
timates” the key rate since it assumes the same key rate
as a static model. The observable model correctly cap-
tures the decrease in key rate due to turbulence-induced
asymmetry. We can see that, without post-selection, the
performance of MDI-QKD greatly decreases in the pres-
ence of turbulence.
In Fig. 3(b), we plot the observable model obtained
from the two threshold methods versus no post-selection.
As can be seen, the R = 0 boundary Ωboundary (and the
approximated Ωjoint which has a key rate just slightly
less than the former) captures the most information
of the key rate function and results in a key rate
very similar to the upper bound of integration model
RIntegration, which asymptotically utilizes all information
of the probability function and is expected to always
produces higher key rate than models that utilize
average values - i.e. an upper-bound for the observable
model. Nonetheless, we can see that using the thresh-
olds, the performance we obtain with observable model
approaches this upper bound very closely, meaning that
the thresholds we propose are near-optimal.
IV. DISCUSSIONS
In this work we make an important observation that
turbulence-induced channel asymmetry decreases the key
rate of MDI-QKD. This means that using post-selection
is not only a potential means of improvement, but ac-
tually might be necessity in acquiring a good rate, since
simply not addressing the turbulence will result in low
rate. We then proposed the powerful solution of a
prefixed-threshold post-selection method for MDI-QKD,
that can greatly increase the maximum tolerable loss in
MDI-QKD communications, paving the way towards fu-
ture experimental implementations of MDI-QKD.
A few remaining questions include: (1) although we
numerically show that certain threshold choices can re-
sult in near-optimal key rate, it remains to be shown an-
alytically why such a boundary of R = 0 gives maximum
key rate after post-selection. (2) In reality the free-space
channels between Alice and Bob are likely not of equal
mean transmittances (e.g. due to different distances).
The R(ηA, ηB) map (and R=0 boundary) method in
principle holds true for asymmetric cases where the two
channels have different mean transmittances ηA0 6= ηB0
(which will be represented by a lopsided joint PDTC),
and the users can also choose different intensities (which
results in a lopsided R(ηA, ηB) contour too). More test-
ing remains to be shown for these cases. (3) finite-size ef-
fects are important considerations in practical QKD. For
this case the intensities (and the probabilities of sending
them) need to be highly optimized for a good key rate,
and the optimal parameters change with distance - which
changes the rate function too. Moreover, post-selection
not only decreases the total amount of signals, but will
also result in stronger statistical fluctuation among post-
selected signals too, hence affecting the key rate. In this
case a more careful discussion is needed. These questions
will be the subject of our future studies.
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